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I. INTRODUCTION
Terri Lynn Conley suffered from cervical adenosis.' She under-
went surgery for removal of most of her cervix, as well as removal of
other precancerous and cancerous tumors.2 Conley's mother ingested
the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES)3 twenty years before while Conley
1. Adenosis is defined as "a more or less generalized glandular disease." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 24 (23d ed. 1976). The more severe complication associated with
exposure to diethylstilbestrol is adenocarcinoma, usually of the clear cell type. 13A A.
FRANK, COURTROOM MEDICINE: CANCER § 20.31 (1985). Adenocarcinoma is defined as "[a]
malignant neoplasm of epithelial cells in glandular or glandlike pattern." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 22 (23d ed. 1976). It is not known whether adenosis is a precursor of
malignancy. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 1126 (38th ed. 1984).
2. Initial Brief for Appellant at 2, Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1985).
3. Diethylstilbestrol is a synthetic hormone which duplicates the activity of estrogen.
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 177, 342 N.W.2d 37, 43, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 107
(1984). DES is also known generically as dienestrol and diethylstilbestrol dipropionate (DSD).
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 317 n.l, 343 N.W.2d 164, 166 n.1, cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 123 (1984). Before doctors prescribed DES as a miscarriage preventative, they prescribed
it for treatment of menopausal symptoms, senile vaginitis, gonorrheal vaginitis, and
suppression of lactation. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 178, 342 N.W.2d at 43. For a time, ironically,
DES was used a a postcoital contraceptive ("morning after" pill). Comment, DES and a
Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 963 n.2 (1978). Today,
DES is indicated in the treatment of certain menopausal problems, atrophic vaginitis,
kraurosis vulvae, female hypogonadism, female castration, primary ovarian failure, breast
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was present in utero.4 Doctors commonly prescribed DES as a miscar-
riage preventative around the time period that Conley's mother was
pregnant,5 but subsequent research linked in utero exposure to DES to
the kind of cancer that Conley developed.6
Conley brought an action against eleven manufacturers who had
produced DES both before and during her mother's pregnancy.7 She
alleged that the DES her mother ingested during pregnancy caused
her own medical complications.8 She was unable to identify the spe-
cific manufacturer of the DES that her mother ingested,9 but she sug-
gested four alternative theories of recovery in lieu of the traditional
tort requirement that the plaintiff identify specific tortfeasors 10
The trial court granted motions to dismiss and judgments on the
pleadings for the defendants because of Conley's inability to identify
the specific manufacturer.'I On appeal, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed, held: failure to allege legal causation by identifying
the specific tortfeasors precludes recovery. The district court recog-
cancer in selected women and men, and prostatic carcinoma. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE
1126 (38th ed. 1984).
4. Initial Brief for Appellant at 2, Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1985).
5. See supra note 3.
6. See Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina: Association of
Maternal Stilbestrol Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284 N. ENG. J. MED.
878 (1971).
7. Initial Brief for Appellant at 2, Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1985).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id. at 7-8. The four theories listed were: (1) alternative liability; (2) concert of action;
(3) enterprise liability; and (4) market share liability.
11. Id. at 10. A brief history of the development and marketing of DES is helpful in
understanding the nature of the manufacturer identification problem. In the 1930's, British
researchers synthesized DES, but the formula was never patented and so it remained in the
public domain. DES could be administered orally, and could also be produced at a fraction of
the cost of isolating natural estrogens. By the end of 1940, ten drug companies had applied to
the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for authorization to market DES for
treatment of four medical complications. For a list of these complications, see supra note 3.
The FDA approved the use of DES as a miscarriage preventative in 1947. The number of
companies that produced DES between 1947 and 1971 has been estimated at up to 300, with
the number fluctuating greatly from year to year. The drug was marketed under trade names
and generically, and some companies were known to supply it to their competitors. The FDA
required that DES be produced under a single chemical formula; therefore, the complications
associated with it cannot be traced to any one manufacturer's formulation. Drug companies
may not have kept records of when and where they had marketed DES, and the pharmacies
that dispensed the drug may have lost or destroyed their records. In 1971, researchers linked
DES to the development of cancer in young women who were daughters of women who had
ingested DES during pregnancy. The cancer develops many years after the exposure to the
drug. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 177-81, 342 N.W.2d 37, 43-45, cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 107 (1984).
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nized, however, the compelling argument in favor of relaxing the
identification requirement in DES-like situations, and considered vari-
ous theories fashioned by courts of other jurisdictions. 2 The court
proposed its own theory of liability for adoption in Florida, and urged
its serious consideration by the supreme court. The court concluded,
however, that it lacked authority to approve a new theory of liability
before the Supreme Court of Florida had done so." It certified the
following question to the supreme court as an issue of great public
concern: "Does Florida recognize a cause of action against a defend-
ant for marketing defective DES when the plaintiff admittedly cannot
establish that a particular defendant was responsible for the injury?"
Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (peti-
tion for review filed Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 67,626).
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FROM OUTSIDE OF FLORIDA
American courts have approved various theories of recovery
when confronted with cases where the plaintiff was unable to identify
the specific tortfeasor responsible for causing his or her injury.14 Cer-
tain policy considerations justify these courts looking beyond the
boundaries of accepted tort law to fashion new remedies. The policies
12. 477 So. 2d 600, 602-06 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (petition for review filed Sept. 10, 1985)
(No. 67,626). The court discussed these cases: Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345
F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enterprise liability); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (market share
liability); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (alternative liability); Bichler v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981), affid, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d
182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982) (concert of action); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash.
2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (market-share alternate liability).
13. But see Copeland v. Celotex Corp., 447 So. 2d 908, 913 n.5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984),
quashed on other grounds, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985) (noting that a Florida district court is not
precluded from fashioning new theories in an area the supreme court has not yet explored).
14. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (allowed cause of action for DES plaintiff under market
share liability theory); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 123 (1984) (allowed cause of action for DES plaintiff under modified alternative
liability theory and concert of action theory); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d
581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (allowed cause of action for DES plaintiff under market share-
alternative liability theory); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 177, 342 N.W.2d 37, 43,
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984) (allowed cause of action for DES plaintiff under risk
contribution theory); see also Annot., 22 A.L.R. 4th 183 (1983) (collection of cases in which
courts have considered new theories of liability in manufacturer identification cases). But see,
e.g., Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (cause of action
denied for DES plaintiff when applying Florida law); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp.
1004 (D.S.C. 1981) (recovery denied for DES plaintiff when applying South Carolina law);
Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (cause of action denied for DES plaintiff);
Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (198 1) (cause of action
denied for DES plaintiff).
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identified and discussed in this note are separated into two major cate-
gories: (1) general tort law policy considerations that blend and com-
plement one another, and (2) two major policies for the imposition of
liability on manufacturers of defective products in products liability
cases.' 5 These policy considerations will have a major effect on a DES
case. Various courts have recognized them as appropriate guideposts
when trying to accommodate the "competing demands for change
and stability."' 6 The Supreme Court of Florida must consider these
policy considerations in the DES context because it presents the court
with a factual circumstance that strains the current boundaries of
accepted tort doctrine. Because these general tort law and products
liability policies are the reasons behind the doctrines that courts
accept now, it necessarily follows that the court must use them to
guide its analysis of this DES products liability case. Application of
these policies may lead to recovery for a DES plaintiff.
A. General Tort Law Policies
1. THE CHANGING NEEDS OF SOCIETY
Unfortunately, courts often face factual circumstances where jus-
tice and equity compel the resolution of a dispute in favor of one
party, but established tort law doctrines are inadequate to effect such
a resolution. These situations are products of an ever-changing soci-
ety; therefore, the court must use policy considerations when deciding
whether or not to create a new doctrine of liability, or to modify an
existing one, in order to meet the needs of a changing society.
The Supreme Court of California confronted such a situation in
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.7 In Sindell, the plaintiff had a malig-
nant bladder tumor surgically removed.'" The cancer was a result of
the DES which her mother ingested during pregnancy. The plaintiff
15. The general tort law policies are: (1) the law should be ready to fashion new remedies
to meet the changing needs of society; (2) the purpose of tort law is to compensate the plaintiff
for injuries resulting from the wrongful actions of others; and (3) the law should prefer
innocent plaintiffs over possibly culpable defendants. See infra notes 17-55 and accompanying
text.
The two major underlying policies in products liability law are: (1) the imposition of
liability on manufacturers is an incentive for the manufacturers to adequately test their
products in order to ensure their safety; and (2) the imposition of liability is appropriate
because the manufacturers, by passing on the cost to the consumers, are better able to spread
the risk of loss caused by defective design. See infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
16. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 463, 463 (1962),
reprinted in EsSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 314, 314 (1964).
17. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
18. Id. at 594-95, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Sindell also suffered from
adenosis and must be regularly monitored by biopsy or coloscopy in order to have early
warning of further malignancy. Id. at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
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could not identify the specific manufacturer of the DES, and sug-
gested three theories of recovery for the court to consider. 19 The
court rejected all three theories for various reasons, 20 but fashioned its
own theory of recovery in response to her situation.21 Justice Mosk,
writing for the court, recognized the need for the law to adapt to new
situations created by a changing society:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances
in science and technology create fungible goods which may harm
consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer.
The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior
doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to
fashion remedies to meet these changing needs. Just as Justice
Traynor... in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co .... recognized that
in an era of mass production and complex marketing methods the
traditional standard of negligence was insufficient to govern the
obligations of manufacturer to consumer, so should we acknowl-
edge that some adaptation of the rules of causation and liability
may be appropriate in these recurring circumstances. 22
The court's willingness to adapt the law to new circumstances is
indicative of a judicial philosophy that sees the law as a servant of
society, not as its master. Law remains useful only so long as it
undergoes a metamorphosis that parallels that of society. "Any legal
system, to remain viable over a span of time, must have the flexibility
to admit change."23 The Sindell court used policy considerations to
reach its result. Although many may disagree with the method cho-
sen by the Sindell court to resolve the defendant-identification issue,
the importance of Sindell is that a court, to responsibly fulfill its obli-
19. Sindell advanced the theories of alternative liability, concert of action, and enterprise
liability. Id. at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
20. The Sindell court found that the facts of the case could not be accommodated within
the confines of the proffered theories. Id. at 598-610, 607 P.2d at 928-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
136-43.
21. The court fashioned the "market share" theory of liability, which required that only a
"substantial share" of the DES market be joined in the action, with liability for each defendant
approximating its market share of the DES market. Id. at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 144-46. Commentators have favored the market share theory, outlined in Sindell.
See, e.g., Note, Market Share Liability. An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 668 (1981); Note, Risk Contribution: An Undesirable New Method for Apportioning
Damages in the DES Cases, 1985 J. CORP. L. 743. The market share theory has also been met
with considerable disfavor. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 159-
60 (1980); Fern & Sichel, Evolving Tort Liability Theories. Are They Taking the
Pharmaceutical Industry Into an Era of Absolute Liability?, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 763 (1985);
Comment, Market Share Liability: Is California A Mere Gadfly On The Products Liability
Scene Or Is It A Harbinger Of A National Trend?, 11 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 129 (1984).
22. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citation omitted).
23. Keeton, supra note 16, at 463.
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gations, must see the scope of its role in society as encompassing the
power to modify existing legal doctrines to meet the needs of the soci-
ety it serves.24
2. PLAINTIFF COMPENSATION
When fashioning a new remedy, or modifying an existing one to
meet the needs of society, a court will look to general policies to guide
it in its task. One such policy courts recognize is that the purpose of
tort law is to compensate an injured plaintiff for wrongs others
commit.
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.2 presented the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan with a DES case which had a manufacturer identification prob-
lem.26  The court considered the applicability of two theories of
recovery: (1) alternative liability, and (2) concert of action. 27  It
found that their application would be appropriate in the DES context
because Michigan courts already had adopted the policies underlying
these theories.21 One of the underlying policy reasons the court iden-
tified was that the "purpose of tort law is to compensate injured
persons. ' '29
In its analysis, the Abel court referred to Holloway v. General
24. Professor Keeton noted the following passage for consideration:
[T]he judge who has discovered the freedom and the power which are his should
be chastened rather than elated by the discovery. It is possible to harbor this
knowledge without deriving from it the conclusion that the judge should convert
himself into a ruler, a manipulator of those who have reposed in him a very
special trust.
Id. at 471 n. 19 (quoting Cooperrider, The Rule of Law and the Judicial Process, 59 MICH. L.
REV. 501, 513 (1961)).
25. 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 123 (1984).
26. The Abel plaintiffs sued 16 manufacturers that had distributed DES in Michigan. The
plaintiffs alleged that the DES had caused their cancerous and precancerous growths. Some of
them were unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the DES that they were exposed to in
utero, so they sought to impose liability on the whole group as an alternative method of
recovering damages. Id. at 319-21, 343 N.W.2d at 167-68.
27. Id. at 324-39, 343 N.W.2d at 170-76. The Abel analysis differs from that of many
other courts because the plaintiffs alleged that all manufacturers who marketed DES in
Michigan were before the court, and the court, reviewing the issue in the context of a motion
for summary judgment, must accept as true all well-pleaded facts. Id. at 321-24, 343 N.W.2d
at 169.
The court also pointed out the difference between the case before it and the classic
alternative liability case, exemplified by Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948):
"[In Summers, each defendant was negligent toward the plaintiff; here, each defendant was
negligent toward a plaintiff, but each defendant was not negligent toward each plaintiff. Thus,
all defendants were not negligent toward each plaintiff, and each defendant could not have
caused each plaintiff's injury." Abel, 418 Mich. at 330, 343 N.W.2d at 172-73.
28. Abel, 418 Mich. at 327, 337-38, 343 N.W.2d at 172, 176.
29. Id. at 328, 343 N.W.2d at 171.
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Motors Corp. ,30 in which the question arose whether the plaintiff had
the burden of proving the specific cause of a defect when alternative
causes were possible. In Holloway, a woman was injured and her
father killed when the vehicle in which they were riding left the road
and struck a utility pole.3' The plaintiffs alleged that a defective ball
joint assembly broke, causing the driver to lose control of the car.32
This all occurred while the plaintiffs drove the car across chuckholes
in the road. The court, in response to a policy argument advanced by
General Motors,33 stated that "[i]t is the injury inflicted on the plain-
tiff that entitles him to a remedy, not his skill in discovering precisely
where defendant's manufacturing process went wrong."' 34 The court
held that as long as the plaintiffs presented evidence from which a
jury could reasonably infer that some defect in the manufacturing
process caused the accident, their burden of proof had been met even
though they were unable to isolate the specific cause.3" The court also
noted that an alternative liability situation presented a "somewhat
analogous situation" in which the "rule is that a plaintiff need not
prove which person among alternative negligent tortfeasors caused his
injury."'36 The implication of this discussion by the court is that in
order to give meaning to the policy that tort law should compensate
injured plaintiffs, it is reasonable to shift burdens of proof in unusual
factual circumstances where failure to do so would preclude recovery.
If there is a proof problem that is difficult to resolve, the law should
stand ready to compensate the injured plaintiff unless the defendant
can exonerate himself.
The Holloway decision was an easy one because the question on
rehearing was premised on the fact that some defect in the defendant's
product caused the accident. The only issue in that case was whether
the plaintiff must prove which one. The Abel case presented a more
difficult question because the problem involved proving which defend-
30. 403 Mich. 614, 271 N.W.2d 777 (1978).
31. Id. at 619, 271 N.W.2d at 779.
32. Id.
33. General Motors (GM) moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff
had failed to identify the specific cause of the defect. GM contended that it needed specific
identification of the cause so it could effect corrective measures. It admitted that the only
possible causes of the break occurred during the manufacturing, but advanced the argument
that "one of the purposes of tort law is to encourage those engaged in activity which causes
injury to adopt remedial measures to avoid so injuring other persons," and that this purpose
would not be served if the plaintiff did not specifically identify the cause. Id. at 618, 625-26,
271 N.W.2d at 779, 783.
34. Id. at 626, 271 N.W.2d at 783.
35. Id. at 618, 271 N.W.2d at 779.
36. Id. at 625 n.15, 271 N.W.2d at 782 n.15.
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ant manufactured the DES that harmed the plaintiffs.3 7 The Abel
court recognized that the proof problem in this DES case was "sub-
stantially and significantly distinguishable" from the classic alterna-
tive liability case.3" The court also recognized that the same policy
consideration which compels it to use this theory in the classic case
also compels it to adapt the theory to variations of the original fact
pattern, such as the DES cases, which present similar, but not identi-
cal, problems of proof.
3. PLAINTIFF PREFERENCE
The law should show a preference for an innocent plaintiff over a
possibly culpable defendant. The policy presented by this statement is
a corollary of the policy that tort law should compensate the injured
plaintiff. These two policies are entirely intertwined. If the purpose
of tort law is to compensate the injured plaintiff, then the effect is a
legal preference for an innocent plaintiff over a possibly culpable
defendant in an appropriate circumstance. Likewise, if the law shows
a preference for innocent plaintiffs, then the end result will be a judi-
cial tendency to compensate injured plaintiffs rather than to deny
recovery. Each policy seems to be the natural consequence of the
other.
In the landmark case of Summers v. Tice,39 the Supreme Court of
California recognized the policy of preferring the injured plaintiff over
a possibly culpable defendant. In Summers, the plaintiff and defend-
ants were hunting quail. The plaintiff was standing seventy-five yards
from the defendants when one of them flushed a bird into flight
between themselves and the plaintiff. Both defendants shot at the
quail with shotguns at the same time, and two shots hit the plaintiff.4
It was impossible to determine whether the shots that hit the plaintiff
were from one gun or the other, or one from each.4" The trial court
found that both defendants were negligent toward the plaintiff, and
that the negligence of both defendants was the legal cause of the plain-
42tiff's injuries. The defendants appealed, arguing "that there [was]
not sufficient evidence to show which defendant was guilty of the neg-
ligence which caused the injuries. ' 43 The court upheld the lower
37. Abel, 418 Mich. at 318, 343 N.W.2d at 167.
38. Id. at 329, 343 N.W.2d at 172. See supra note 25.
39. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
40. Id. at 82, 199 P.2d at 1-2. Even though the gunshot struck the plaintiff in two places,
the one shot that entered his eye was the major injury for the purposes of damage assessment.
41. Id. at 83, 199 P.2d at 3.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 82, 199 P.2d at 2.
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court judgment, and reasoned that:
When we consider the relative position of the parties and the
results that would flow if the plaintiff was required to pin the injury
on one of the defendants only, a requirement that the burden of
proof on that subject be shifted to defendants becomes manifest.
They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward plaintiff. They
brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them
injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve
himself if he can. The injured party has been placed by defendants
in the unfair position of pointing to which defendant caused the
harm. If one can escape the other may also and plaintiff is
remediless."
In the Sindell case, the same court adapted the Summers alterna-
tive liability framework to fashion what is popularly known as the
market share liability theory.45 The court stated that "[t]he most per-
suasive reason for finding plaintiff states a cause of action is that
advanced in Summers: as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent
defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury."4 6 The court
added that failure to provide evidence of causation was not the fault
of either the plaintiff or defendants, but that the defendants' "conduct
in marketing a drug the effects of which are delayed for many years
played a significant role in creating the unavailability of proof."4 7
In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,4" the Supreme Court of Wisconsin con-
fronted the DES causation problem. The Collins court recognized
that available tort doctrines would be inadequate to allow recovery
for the plaintiff because of the insurmountable problem of manufac-
turer identification.49 The court noted that the Wisconsin Constitu-
44. Id. at 83, 199 P.2d at 4.
45. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See supra note 20.
46. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. But see Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (citations omitted) (DES case):
Plaintiffs are innocent and claim serious injuries alleged to result from their
mothers' use of DES. Yet simply to state, as have courts ruling in favor of
plaintiffs, that as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
latter should bear the cost of injury .... and that defendants can better absorb the
cost, ... ignores strong countervailing considerations.
•.. Competing with the interests of appellants are legitimate concerns that
liability will discourage desired pharmaceutical research and development while
adding little incentive to production of safe products, for all companies face
potential liability regardless of their efforts.
Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 246-47.
47. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
48. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984).
49. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 181-82, 342 N.W.2d at 45.
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tion provides that " '[e]very person is entitled to a certain remedy for
all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or
character,' "'0 and that this provision authorized the courts to fashion
a new remedy when an adequate remedy does not exist. 5 In making
the decision whether to fashion a new remedy, the court stated:
We are faced with a choice of either fashioning a method of recov-
ery for the DES case which will deviate from traditional notions of
tort law, or permitting possibly negligent defendants to escape lia-
bility to an innocent, injured plaintiff. In the interests of justice
and fundamental fairness, we choose to follow the former
alternative.52
The court considered the various theories submitted by the plaintiff,
and then rejected all of them. 3 The court found the defendants liable
on its own theory which it based on the notion that "[e]ach defendant
contributed to the risk of injury to the public and, consequently, the
risk of injury to individual plaintiffs." 54
50. Id. (quoting Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9). Cf FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 ("The courts shall
be open to every person for redress for any injury, and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial or delay.").
51. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 182, 342 N.W.2d at 45.
52. Id. at 181, 342 N.W.2d at 45.
53. The Wisconsin court is not alone in rejecting various alternative theories before
fashioning its own theory of recovery. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (fashioned market share
liability theory); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (petition for
review filed Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 67,626) (fashioned its own market share-alternative liability
theory and certified a question to the supreme court); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102
Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (fashioned market share-alternative liability theory).
Courts which have dealt with the question of whether or not to fashion a new theory of
recovery for DES plaintiffs have followed different formulas in calculating that answer. Those
who fashioned new theories saw the question as a two-part problem: Is the plaintiff
legitimately entitled to a remedy? If yes, what is the most equitable way of apportioning
damages among the defendant manufacturers? The first determination is all-important. If it is
determined that the plaintiff should recover, then the court examines the various theories pled.
If all are inadequate, the court then fashions its own theory of recovery. See, e.g., Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
123 (1984); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776
(1982); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984). Courts that
have denied recovery see the question as having only one part: Will existing and accepted tort
doctrines allow recovery under the facts of a given case? The answer is always negative
because the essential element of manufacturer identification is missing. These courts will often
admit that a deserving plaintiff must go without a remedy. See, e.g., Morton v. Abbott
Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (applying Florida law); Ryan v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981) (applying South Carolina law); Namm v. Charles E.
Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981).
54. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191, 342 N.W.2d at 49 (footnote omitted). The Collins risk
contribution theory is premised on the concept that society should not at any time tolerate the
creation of the risk. Participation in the creation of the risk is the tortious activity that
resulted in injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 191 n.10, 342 N.W.2d at 49 n.10. See Robinson,
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These cases embody the important concept that the policy con-
siderations of meeting the changing needs of society, plaintiff compen-
sation, and plaintiff preference, compelled the courts first to make the
decision as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy. The
courts did not consider the difficulty of constructing a remedy. If the
plaintiff was entitled to recover, then the courts, guided by these pol-
icy considerations, were obligated to find a theory which would afford
an appropriate remedy. If one did not exist among traditional tort
theories, then the courts fashioned a new theory. The fact that this
task was difficult was no excuse for not fulfilling this duty.
Courts must not restrain themselves within the confines of
existing tort doctrines, thereby sacrificing legitimate claims to stare
decisis. The driving force behind any decision should be applicable
public policy, not simply fitting a set of facts to the template of an
existing doctrine. 5
B. Underlying Products Liability Policies
1. SAFETY INCENTIVE
The law of products liability has changed dramatically over the
last century. The changes are the result of a major philosophical
upheaval in the courts in response to the industrialization of America.
The strict rules, which courts designed to protect industry from
destruction by numerous lawsuits, have given way to strict liability,
which courts designed to protect the consumer from the excesses of
industry. 6 There are several policy reasons behind this shift. One
major consideration is that imposing liability on a manufacturer for
injuries caused by defects in its products will be an incentive to ade-
quately test its products to ensure they are safe before marketing
them.57 Several courts considered this policy in their deliberations in
Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982). But
see Note, supra note 21, at 743 (describing theory of risk contribution that the Collins court
ultimately used).
55. This is not intended to mean that policy considerations should prevail over doctrine.
Doctrine is merely a means of putting policy into action. See infra note 131.
56. Professor Epstein traces the development of products liability law through three
stages. The first stage "had as its major premise the belief that the grave administrative
complications and adverse social consequences of products liability suits were so manifest that
strenuous efforts were needed to fashion 'fixed and definite' rules to prevent the economic ruin
of product suppliers." See EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 5. The second stage places the
responsibility on the manufacturer to supply the product it had promised and on the consumer
to use the product in the manner in which it was intended. Id. at 6. The third stage places
almost the entire responsibility on the manufacturer and little or no responsibility on the
consumer. Id.
57. But see id. at 40-44 (1980). Professor Epstein argues that:
[T]here is good reason to assume that the only difference between negligence and
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DES and DES-like cases.5 8
The Supreme Court of California, in Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries,59 based its decision to fashion a new remedy for the plaintiff, in
part, on the safety incentive aspect of modem products liability law.
The Sindell court concluded that:
The manufacturer is in the best position to discover and guard
against defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects; thus,
holding it liable for defects and failure to warn of harmful effects
will provide an incentive to product safety .... These considera-
tions are particularly significant where medication is involved, for
the consumer is virtually helpless to protect himself from serious,
sometimes permanent, sometimes fatal, injuries caused by deleteri-
ous drugs.6"
A New York federal district court, in Hall v. E. . Du Pont De
Nemours & Co. ,6 faced a manufacturer identification problem similar
to that of DES cases. In Hall, exploding blasting caps, in unrelated
incidents, injured several children. Each child found an unlabeled
strict liability will be not the number of accidents that occur but the number of
accidents that receive compensation. Thus if the rule of negligence is defined in
classical cost-benefit analysis, the defendant will cease to take precautions when
it becomes cheaper socially to permit accidents than it is to avoid them. Under a
strict liability system the defendant will in theory opt for the same point of safety,
ceasing to take precautions when they are no longer cost-effective, even if he will
have to pay for the accidents that do occur. The only difference between the two
rules therefore goes to the issue of compensation for victims, which, however
important, only involves the wealth distribution between parties after accidents
and not the conduct of parties before them. With the negligence rule the
defendant who takes cost-effective precautions need never pay damages. With
strict liability, the defendant must pay damages no matter what precautions are
taken. The differences between the two theories do raise serious ethical issues,
but those are by definition immaterial in an inquiry that focuses solely upon
incentive effects.
Id. at 40-41 (footnote omitted). One problem with Professor Epstein's analysis is that the
ethical issues that he claims are immaterial when focusing solely upon the incentive effects of
liability theories cannot and should not be so easily ignored. Product manufacturers do not
exist in a vacuum, with their actions governed only by a pure cost-benefit analysis without
taking these ethical issues into account. This world that he describes does not exist anywhere
outside the economists' imaginations. The act of intentionally allowing into the market a
product that has a known propensity for consumer injury would serve to expose the manufac-
turer to liability for punitive damages. This liability would fall above the compensatory dam-
age award planned for in the cost-benefit analysis. A manufacturer would not be able to plan
for punitive damages, because a jury is instructed to award such damages in amounts calcu-
lated to punish the manufacturer. This would, by definition, be an amount in excess of what
had been planned for in the original cost-benefit analysis.
58. See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
59. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
60. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citations omitted).
61. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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blasting cap, which they were able to detonate with ease.62 The plain-
tiffs could not identify the particular manufacturers of the caps that
injured them individually; therefore, their complaint alleged that
"each cap in question was designed and manufactured jointly or sev-
erally by the six corporate defendants or by other unnamed manufac-
turers, and by their trade association. '63 They further alleged that the
manufacturers knew that blasting caps frequently caused injury to
children, and that they had jointly considered and rejected the option
of labeling the caps.' Because the plaintiffs could not identify the
specific manufacturer responsible for their injuries, the defendants
moved to dismiss the claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not
state claims upon which relief could be granted. The court denied the
defendants' motion 65 and shifted the burden of proof on the issue of
causation to the manufacturers. Before reaching its conclusion, the
Hall court noted the reasons for imposing strict liability on
manufacturers:
A manufacturer is in the best position to discover defects or
dangers in his product and to guard against them through appro-
priate design, manufacturing and distribution safeguards, inspec-
tion and warnings.... A rigorous rule of liability with enhanced
possibilities of large recoveries is an "incentive" to maximize safe
design or a "deterrence" to dangerous design, manufacture, and
distribution.66
By imposing joint liability on each member of the blasting cap
industry, the court shifted the burden of proof to each manufac-
turer-each manufacturer had to exonerate itself to escape liability.
This burden acts as an incentive for manufacturers to take necessary
precautions to ensure the safety of persons who might foreseeably
come into contact with their products.
The Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. 67 court expressed the same reasoning
that the Sindell and Hall courts did to justify imposing liability on the
DES manufacturers:
[T]he cost of damages [sic] awards will act as an incentive for drug
companies to test adequately the drugs they place on the market
for general medical use. This incentive is especially important in
the case of mass-marketed drugs because the consumers and their
physicians in most instances rely upon advice given by the supplier
62. Id. at 359.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 386.
66. Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
67. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984).
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and the scientific community and, consequently, are virtually help-
less to protect themselves from serious injuries caused by deleteri-
ous drugs.68
All of these courts found that imposing liability on manufactur-
ers was a legitimate vehicle for giving them incentive to ensure the
safety of the consuming public. These courts also recognized that
consumers have an inherent difficulty in protecting themselves from
defective products. In light of these factors, all of these courts have
reasoned that it was appropriate to impose liability in these cases
because the manufacturers were in a better position than the con-
sumer to take necessary safety precautions.
2. RISK SPREADING
Another major consideration in products liability law when a
court must decide whether or not to impose liability on manufacturers
is that the manufacturers are better able to spread the risk of loss by
passing on the cost to consumers. 69  This consideration is often
68. Id. at 192-93, 342 N.W.2d at 49-50 (footnote omitted).
69. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 44-48 (1980). The most serious argument that
Professor Epstein raises is that:
The ability of any particular [manufacturing] firm to shoulder the risks of
liability insurance depends in very large measure upon the substantive content of
the products liability law for which the insurance is written. Where . . . the
manufacturer is in essence held liable for products which fail to live up to his
own standards of construction or performance, it should not be too difficult to
calculate the risk associated with marketing a defective product and to test or
inspect the product in advance of sale in order to reduce the likelihood of the
occurrence of the insurable event....
The recent extensions of products liability law have, however, vastly
complicated the task of underwriting. Where, for example, a manufacturer can
be held responsible because a jury . . . decides that its product . . . could have
been designed better than it was, or sold with warnings more comprehensive than
those provided, it becomes difficult if not impossible for the usual techniques of
inspection and underwriting to yield any adequate assessment of the additional
risks to be insured. When product modifications do not insulate the
manufacturer from responsibility for subsequent injuries, the underwriting
judgment must not only take into account the dangers in the product as it is, but
also the dangers of the product as it might be transformed. And when all forms
of "foreseeable" misuse no longer constitute a defense against liability, the risk
involved ... depends as much on the skill and training of the user as it does on
the intrinsic merit of the product.
These and other substantive difficulties are further compounded because the
product liability rules apply not only to new products but also to those long in
the stream of commerce. If it is a nightmare to estimate the contingent liability
costs for ancient machines in unknown condition and in unknown hands, those
difficulties are not solved by the institution of insurance. Insurance only transfers
and pools the risks. It cannot reduce the costs associated with those risks or the
uncertainties involved in their measurement.
Id. at 47-48 (footnotes omitted). Professor Epstein's arguments certainly point out the difficul-
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accompanied by the safety incentive consideration, and the courts
have used them together to justify a relaxation of the traditional ele-
ment of defendant identification.
Another DES case substantially similar in its facts to Sindell and
Collins is Martin v. Abbott Laboratories.70 The Supreme Court of
Washington, in deciding Martin, expressed the risk spreading policy
in this way:
[A]s between the injured plaintiff and the possibly responsible drug
company, the drug company is in a better position to absorb the
cost of the injury. The drug company can either insure itself
against liability, absorb the damage award, or pass the cost along
to the consuming public as a cost of doing business. We conclude
that it is better to have drug companies or consumers share the
cost of the injury than to place the burden solely on the innocent
plaintiff.71
The Sindell court stated the policy in much the same way, and
pointed out that "'[t]he cost of an injury and the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and
a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufac-
turer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.' "72
The Hall court pointed out that loss distribution is a reasonable policy
because accidents and injuries are seen as an inevitable, and therefore
foreseeable, cost of consumers using a product.73
Manufacturers are aware that injuries to consumers caused by
their products are an inevitable consequence of placing products into
the stream of commerce. For this reason, they take into account their
foreseeable liability for injuries when they price their products for
sale. They pass the cost of insuring themselves against this liability on
to their consumers-the cost is reflected in the prices consumers pay.
This is a legitimate cost of putting a product on the market. Consum-
ers, on the other hand, are not in a position to insure themselves
against the potential catastrophic consequences of using presumably
ties in insuring products to cover liability for foreseeable and unforeseeable injuries caused by
their use. The arguments do not, however, answer the question of who is better able to absorb
the cost of the risk of injury-the consumer or the manufacturer. Many courts have logically
concluded that the manufacturer is in a far superior position to do so because of its ability to
spread the cost of this insurance to all of its customers, no matter how difficult it is to value the
risk.
70. 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
71. Id. at 604, 689 P.2d at 382.
72. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr at 144 (quoting Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring)).
73. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 368.
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safe products. Their insurance is often inadequate to compensate
them for the total amount of their loss. Because manufacturers are in
a better position to insure themselves for these losses, it is appropriate
that they bear this burden.
III. FLORIDA TORT LAW POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The Supreme Court of Florida has not yet passed on the issue of
whether a plaintiff must identify the specific manufacturer in a DES-
like case to maintain a cause of action.74 The policy considerations
previously discussed, however, have been expressed in Florida case
law. The Florida courts, in particular the supreme court, have relied
on these considerations to justify fashioning new remedies or to recon-
sider the usefulness of accepted doctrines. 5
The supreme court faces a major policy decision in the Conley v.
Boyle Drug Co. 76 case. Existing tort doctrines will not afford Terri
Lynn Conley a remedy.77 If the court, however, applies the policy
considerations identified in the DES and DES-like decisions, which
are part of Florida common law, then the court can and should find
74. The market share theory was found, however, to be an inappropriate vehicle for
apportioning liability in an asbestos case. Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla.
1985), quashing 447 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The district court had applied the theory
even though the plaintiff could identify some of the manufacturers of the asbestos that
allegedly caused his injury. Id. The supreme court disagreed, finding that where the plaintiff
can identify at least one manufacturer, the reason for imposition of market share liability does
not exist. Id. at 537. The court went on to say that:
[I]t is important to note there are inherent differences between asbestos products
and the drug DES, for which the market share theory was developed, which
further make the market share theory extremely difficult to apply in asbestos-
injury cases. DES was produced by hundreds of companies pursuant to one
formula. As a result, all DES had identical physical properties and chemical
compositions and, consequently, all DES prescribed to pregnant women created
the same risk of harm to the women's female offspring....
Asbestos products, on the other hand, have widely divergent toxicities, with
some asbestos products presenting a much greater risk of harm than others.
Id. at 537-38. The court stressed the difficult administrative problems that would face the
courts if they had to determine what constitutes a substantial share of the market. This prob-
lem was further complicated by the fact that "the various asbestos products have different
toxicities, [and] the courts would have to determine how to apportion liability for the differing
harmful effects of the different products." Id. at 538. The court was careful, however, to
clearly point out that "we do not find it necessary to accept or reject the market theory
approach." Id. at 539. See generally, Note, Market Share Theory and the Asbestos Suits:
Should the Industry Bite the Dust?, 14 STETSON L. REV. 239 (1984) (noting Copeland v. Celo-
tex Corp., 447 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984))
75. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (discarded contributory
negligence doctrine in favor of comparative negligence doctrine). See also infra note 86.
76. 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (petition for review filed Sept. 10, 1985) (No.
67,626).
77. Id. at 602.
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that she is entitled to a remedy. This section will discuss Florida's
application of the identified policies in various settings, and show how
their application to a DES case may permit recovery for DES
plaintiffs.
A. General Tort Law Policies
1. THE CHANGING NEEDS OF SOCIETY
To meet the changing needs or perceptions of society, Florida
courts have fashioned new remedies or modified existing ones. Courts
form and shape legal doctrines in the context of their contemporane-
ous society. This is necessary for the law to continue to respond to
society, which it serves. Justice Holmes explained it this way:
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of his-
tory. History must be a part of the study, because without it we
cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our business to
know. It is a part of the rational study, because it is the first step
toward an enlightened scepticism [sic], that is, towards a deliberate
reconsideration of the worth of those rules.... For the rational
study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the pres-
ent, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the
master of economics. It is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.
It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past."8
Florida courts have expressed a similar philosophy. The plaintiff
filed suit against the administrator of the estate of a man who had
blown up the plaintiff's house in Waller v. First Savings & Trust Co. ;79
he sought compensation for the damage to his house. The circuit
judge sustained the defendant's demurrer, and held that a cause of
action "sounding in tort" could not survive the death of the
tortfeasor. ° Before ruling on the issue, the supreme court discussed
its role in reexamining common law doctrines:
[I]t does not necessarily follow that when this court has before it a
case on writ of error from a judgment, the affirmance of which will
crystallize into a precedent for the future an unrighteous rule of
decision which is shocking to every conception of justice and fair-
ness, that this court is thereby precluded from re-examining the
law which may be applicable to this case, even to the extent of re-
78. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897), reprinted in 0. W.
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 186-87 (1920).
79. 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931) (en banc).
80. Id. at 1029-30, 138 So. at 782.
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examining the correctness of the conclusions announced in previ-
ous cases, for the purpose of determining whether or not the rule
previously announced is sound, or if sound as a general principle,
whether its application to a case like the one before the court is not
subject to modification in the light of demonstrably unequitable
consequences which have never before been considered or taken
into account.8
1
Ultimately, the court, guided by this principle, held that a right of
action in tort for compensatory damages does not die with the
tortfeasor 2
The Supreme Court of Florida receded from prior decisions rec-
ognizing tort immunity for municipal corporations for the wrongful
acts of their police officers in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach.83 The
Hargrove court realized that blind loyalty to stare decisis was improv-
ident. The court declared that "we must recognize that the law is not
static. The great body of our laws is the product of progressive think-
ing which attunes traditional concepts to the needs and demands of
changing times. . . . Judicial consistency loses its virtue when it is
degraded by the vice of injustice." 4
The Supreme Court of Florida abrogated the common law rule
that contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery for a plain-
tiff in favor of comparative negligence in Hoffman v. Jones.85 The
court cited numerous instances from the past when it had receded
from common law doctrines in response to the changing times.86 It
further explained its obligation to reconsider these doctrines:
81. Id. at 1032, 138 So. at 783.
82. Id. at 1047, 138 So. at 789.
83. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (en banc).
84. Id. at 133. The court, in demonstrating the continuity of its decisions, pointed out that
it was possible to bring new life to an old precedent: "[W]e therefore point out that instead of
disregarding the rule of stare decisis, we now merely restore the original concepts of our
jurisprudence to a position of priority in order to eradicate the deviations that have in our view
detracted from the justice of the initial view." Id. at 134.
85. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). See also Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977)
(assumption of risk absorbed into comparative negligence); Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386
(Fla. 1975) (abolishing doctrine of no contribution among tortfeasors).
86. The court cited a number of cases as support: Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
1971) (established right of wife to recover for loss of consortium resulting from husband's
injuries); Hargrove, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (held municipal corporations could be held liable
for torts of their police); Randolph v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491, 1 So. 2d 480 (1941) (modified
common law doctrine that had given the father the superior right to custody of a child);
Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932) (removed common law exemption for
married women from causes of action sounding in contract); Waller, 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So.
780 (1931) (action in tort does not die with tortfeasor). Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 435-36. But cf.
Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980) (interspousal
immunity retained).
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All rules of the common law are designed for application to
new conditions and circumstances as they may be developed by
enlightened commercial and business intercourse and are intended
to be vitalized by practical application in advanced society....
The contemporary conditions must be met with contemporary
standards which are realistic and better calculated to obtain justice
among all of the parties involved, based upon the circumstances
applying between them at the time in question....
We are, therefore, of the opinion that we do have the power
and authority to reexamine the position we have taken in regard to
contributory negligence and to the rule we have adopted previously
in light of current "social and economic customs" and modem
"conceptions of right and justice."87
DES manufacturer identification presents the kind of problem
that the flexibility of the common law was designed to meet. If the
supreme court accepts review of the Conley case,88 it would have to
modify the traditional tort law requirement of specific tortfeasor iden-
tification in "light of [the] demonstrably unequitable consequences
which have never before been considered or taken into account."8 9
Widespread use of generic drugs creates numerous identification
problems, and these problems are examples of those "contemporary
conditions [that] must be met with contemporary standards which are
. better calculated to obtain justice among all of the parties
involved, based upon the circumstances applying between them at the
time in question." 90
2. PLAINTIFF COMPENSATION
One force behind modifying existing law is a court's recognition
that it should focus on finding a way to compensate the injured plain-
tiff in a fashion which is equitable to all parties. This represents a
shift from the early common law when courts focused on punishing
the tortfeasor.9" Using the "compensation" model rather than the
87. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 436.
88. The decision to grant review is pending. Telephone interview with the Office of Clerk
of the Court, Supreme Court of Florida (Feb. 20, 1986). Several of the defendants petitioned
for a rehearing in the district court on the issue of in personam jurisdiction. For a description
of the issue, see the Combined Initial Brief for Cross-Appellants and Answer Brief of
Appellees at 36-40, Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). The
fourth district denied the rehearing. These defendants raised the same issue before the
supreme court. See Combined Initial Brief of Respondents/Cross-Petitioners Boyle Drug Co.
& Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., and Brief of Respondents, E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. &
Sandoz, Inc. at 42-46, Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., - So. 2d - (Fla. 1986).
89. Waller, 103 Fla. at 1032, 138 So. at 783.
90. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 436.
91. This has not always been the focus of the courts. A discussion of the focus of prior case
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"punishment" model, the Waller court abrogated the common law
rule that tort actions did not survive the death of the tortfeasor. The
court recognized that the only reason for disallowing such an action
at common law was that the punishment effect had been lost because
of the tortfeasor's death.92 If the court was no longer motivated by
punishing the tortfeasor and was, in fact, motivated by compensating
the injured plaintiff, then the reason for the rule no longer existed.
In the recent case of Champion v. Gray,93 the supreme court con-
sidered whether to modify or abrogate the "impact rule" 94 with
law is helpful in understanding their current focus. The Waller court presented such a
discussion:
Torts, under the ancient common law, were regarded as delicts or wrongs
against the individual who was allowed to seek vengeance against the wrongdoer
by mulching him in damages.
The ancient Jewish law.., referred to a vast number of wrongs and injuries,
many of which are now also most exclusively dealt with as crimes. The wrongs,
or torts, were redressed by personal retaliation .... Later a money compensation
seems to have been allowed to serve the purpose of this personal retaliation, and
thus was first recognized the recovery of damages for torts....
The penal law of other ancient communities was not the law of crimes but
was the law of wrongs, or ... the law of "Torts". The person injured proceeded
in retaliation against the wrongdoer by seeking the recovery of damages against
him for the wrong done.
At the head of the civil wrongs recognized by the Roman Law stoodfortum
or theft. Other offenses which we now regard exclusively as crimes were there
treated as "torts" to be avenged by the recovery of damages as a retaliation or in
other words as satisfaction,-not recompense. Money compensation for
homicide and for assaults and violent robbery were provided for.
The criterion of a delict, or tort, under the ancient law was that it was the
person injured, and not the state, which suffered the wrong. So in the infancy of
our jurisprudence, the individual subject injured by a tort depended for
protection against violence or fraud, not on the law of crime, but on the law of
TORT....
The concept of vengeance and not recompense therefore became so
interwoven into the English common law of torts that it was not to be
unexpected that the English common law would regard the tort as having died
with a defendant tort feasor just as a crime now dies with the defendant criminal.
But this concept is opposed to our American theory of jurisprudence where
recompense to the injured for a tort, and not mere vengeance for the wrong is the
object of the right to sue. Our [Declaration] of Rights seems to recognize this
theory in terms, for it preserves to the injured one his "remedy", not his
vengeance for wrongs done him in person or property. Certainly this statement
... means something more than a mere empty platitude placed there as a simple
anachronism.
Waller, 103 Fla. at 1040-41, 138 So. at 786 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 1038, 138 So. at 785 ("When the reason for a rule has passed the rule itself
should no longer stand, and a new rule in harmony with changed conditions should be
recognized ....").
93. 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985).
94. Before allowing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress in any context,
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regard to negligent infliction of emotional distress. Joyce Champion
heard the impact of a drunken driver's car hitting her daughter and
rushed to the accident scene. She collapsed and died after becoming
overcome with shock and grief at the sight of her daughter's dead
body.95 The trial court, relying on precedent,96 dismissed the com-
plaint, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed.97 Guided by
the perception that "the public policy of this state is to compensate
physical injuries ...and physical and mental suffering which flow
from the consequences of the physical injuries," ' the Supreme Court
of Florida modified the "impact rule" to recognize a cause of action
for emotional distress when discernible physical injuries had resulted
from it. These Florida cases illustrate the influence which the policy
to compensate injured plaintiffs has on the shaping of the law. The
Conley DES case presents another situation where this policy should
exert its influence. If the court's focus is on punishing the appropriate
defendant, then it will deny recovery because the punishment purpose
would not be served if the truly culpable defendant escaped liability.
This possibility is the essence of the difficulty in the DES cases. If the
court's focus is on providing compensation to an injured plaintiff,
however, then relaxation of the identification requirement is appropri-
ate. It would allow compensation to a plaintiff with a legitimate claim
from defendants who were definitely responsible for creating the
harmful risk and possibly responsible for the plaintiff's specific injury.
3. PLAINTIFF PREFERENCE
The courts often do not expressly state their policy of preferring
an innocent plaintiff over possibly culpable defendants. Some court
decisions imply the existence of just such a preference. Florida case
law presents several examples of this policy.
An injury occurred in Groves v. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. ,99
when a bottle exploded while in the plaintiff's hand. The trial court
granted a motion for a directed verdict for the defendant because the
plaintiff failed to submit any direct evidence of negligence on the part
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's negligence caused some sort of actual physical
"impact," or touching, upon his person. See Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974),
holding modified in Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985).
95. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18.
96. The trial court relied on Gilliam v. Stewart, in which the supreme court denied
recovery to a woman who suffered a heart attack when a vehicle struck her home. 291 So. 2d
593 (Fla. 1974).
97. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18.
98. Id. at 20.
99. 40 So. 2d 128, petition for reh'g denied, 40 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1949) (per curiam).
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of the defendant. The supreme court reversed and remanded." ° It
reasoned that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not require the
plaintiff to eliminate every remote possibility of injury to the bottle
after it left the defendant's control and up to the time of the explo-
sion. 01 The court said that it was enough for the plaintiff to produce
evidence that would permit a reasonable inference that the bottle was
not subjected to "extraneous harmful influences" before it reached
her. 102 This reasonable inference created a prima facie case of negli-
gence, and shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. 103 By shifting
this burden of proof to the defendant, the court implicitly showed a
preference for the injured plaintiff over the possibly culpable defend-
ant. By enhancing the possibility of recovery for the plaintiff, the
court gave meaning to this policy consideration.
The First District Court of Appeal of Florida confronted the
plaintiff preference issue in Skroh v. Newby, 104 a classic "concert of
action" case. The defendants were racing each other, and one of them
struck and killed a man on a motorcycle. In this wrongful death
case, the court held that even the defendant who did not actually col-
lide with the motorcycle could be liable for the man's death because
his actions in racing constituted negligence proximately causing the
accident.'015 The effect of this decision was to assure compensation for
the plaintiff in the event the "colliding" defendant was insolvent. By
100. Id. at 130.
101. In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 1978),
the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the use of res ipsa loquitur in a case where a tire had
blown out after limited use, causing injuries to the plaintiff. The court "restore[d] the
inference of negligence to its historically proper bounds-that is, when direct evidence of
negligence is unavailable to the plaintiff due to the unusual circumstances of the injuring
incident." Id. at 1341 (emphasis added). The Conley case, though not necessarily premised on
negligence, warrants a res ipsa loquitur-like inference because of the unusual manufacturer
identification circumstance. See also Zyferman v. Taylor, 444 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA),
petition for rev. denied sub. nom. ITT General Controls v. Zyferman, 453 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1984)
(holding that plaintiff does not have the burden of proving the product has been used and
maintained properly till the time of malfunction); Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla.
1st DCA 1981) (holding that evidence of a malfunction creates the inference that a product
was defective, relieving plaintiff of burden of proving there were no other causes). But cf
Gooding v. University Hospital Building, Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984) (holding that
plaintiff in medical malpractice action must present evidence showing that injury more likely
than not resulted from defendant's actions); Vecta Contract, Inc. v. Lynch, 444 So. 2d 1093
(Fla. 4th DCA), petition for rev. denied, 453 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1984) (when weight of evidence
affords nothing more than rank speculation as to who the manufacturer of defective product
was, directed verdict for defendant manufacturer is appropriate) (same court as in Conley).
102. Groves, 40 So. 2d at 130.
103. Id.
104. 237 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
105. Id. at 550.
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implication, the court was expressing its policy determination that it
is better to prefer the innocent plaintiff over the negligent defendants.
Another example of the relaxation of a plaintiff's burden of proof
is Davis v. Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc. 106 In Davis, the plaintiff was
injured in a three-vehicle rear-end collision. She "was an innocent
passenger, free of any contributory negligence."" 7 She joined in the
action everyone who could have caused the accident.108 The supreme
court held that the plaintiff did not have to identify specifically the
individual responsible for her injuries because the evidence showed
that at least one of them must have been responsible.0 9 This decision
relieved the plaintiff of the burden of proving which particular defend-
ant (or defendants) caused her injuries. If the court had ruled other-
wise, it would have left open the possibility that she would be
uncompensated in a situation where she was entitled to a remedy.1 0
By ruling this way, the court implicitly recognized a policy of prefer-
ring innocent plaintiffs over possibly culpable defendants, thus extin-
guishing the possibility of nonrecovery for the plaintiff.
The Conley case presents problems for both the plaintiff and the
defendants. Neither can overcome the problem with more fact-find-
ing. In this situation, guided by the policy of preferring innocent
plaintiffs over possibly culpable defendants, the court should author-
ize recovery by relaxing the traditional requirement of specific
tortfeasor identification so that the plaintiff can maintain a cause of
action.
B. Underlying Products Liability Policies
1. SAFETY INCENTIVE
The Supreme Court of Florida, in West v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co.," recognized that imposing strict liability on manufacturers
would encourage them to produce safe products. A caterpillar grader,
while backing up on a street under construction, ran over Gwendolyn
106. 351 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1977).
107. Id. at 18.
108. The trial court directed a verdict on the issue of liability and instructed the jury to
assess damages and determine which defendants were responsible. Id. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed, stating that the trial court erred by entering a directed verdict for
the plaintiff but against no particular defendant. Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc. v. Davis, 330
So. 2d 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (opinion quashed).
109. Davis v. Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc., 351 So. 2d 17, 18-19 (Fla. 1977).
110. The court cited with approval New Deal Cab Co. v. Stubbs, 90 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1956).
In New Deal Cab, the plaintiff was injured in substantially the same manner. The New Deal
Cab court found "that the plaintiff was an innocent sufferer of harm and was entitled to a
verdict at all events." Davis, 351 So. 2d at 18.
111. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
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West . She died several days later. Her husband brought a products
liability action against the manufacturer for design flaws in its trac-
tor. 11 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certi-
fied to the supreme court the question of whether strict liability was
applicable to products liability cases in Florida.1I 3  The court
responded by formally adopting the doctrine, noting that the Florida
courts had imposed "absolute or strict liability" before.' 14 In its anal-
ysis, the court concluded that:
[S]trict liability should be imposed only when a product the manu-
facturer places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
a human being. The user should be protected from unreasonably
dangerous products or from a product fraught with unexpected
dangers. " 5
By relieving the plaintiff of having to prove negligence on the part of
the manufacturer, thus making the prosecution of a products liability
112. The flaws identified were failure to design a tractor with an audible warning system for
use while backing up and failure to provide adequate rearview mirrors to compensate for the
blind spots. Id. at 82.
113. The question certified was: "'Under Florida law, may a manufacturer be held liable
under the theory of strict liability in tort, as distinct from breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, for injury to a user of the product or a bystander?'" Id. at 84 (quoting from
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 504 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1974)).
114. West, 336 So. 2d at 86. The court traced the development of products liability law in
Florida from the days of privity to the West case. The court felt that recognition of the
doctrine of strict liability was of "no great departure from present law and, in most instances,
accomplishes a mere change of nomenclature." Id.
115. Id. at 86-87. The court formally adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965), which reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
West, 336 So. 2d at 84. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1981) (strict
liability applies to enhanced injury cases); Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla.
1976) (manufacturer liable for defect which causes injury to user when injury occurs as result
of collision, even though defect did not cause collision); but cf Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409
So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982) (successor company cannot be held liable for injuries caused by defects
in original company's products because safety incentive purpose lost). For a history of the
development of strict liability, see generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Lia-
bility to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
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case easier, the court gave manufacturers a greater incentive to ensure
the safety of their products. The court noted that "[m]any products
in the hands of the consumer are sophisticated and even mysterious
articles .... In today's world it is often only a manufacturer who can
fairly be said to know and understand when an article is suitably
designed and safely made for its intended purpose. ' 16
The same policy consideration led the court to abrogate the "pat-
ent danger" doctrine in Auburn Machine Works Co., Inc. v. Jones. 17
In that case, the plaintiff lost his balance when the side of a trench
caved in and his foot became entangled in an exposed chain of a
trench digging machine. The trencher possessed no shield and was
obviously dangerous." 8 The court reasoned that "the patent danger
doctrine encourages manufacturers to be outrageous in their design,
to eliminate safety devices, and to make hazards obvious.""' 9 By
abrogating the "patent danger" doctrine, the court implicitly recog-
nized its policy determination that manufacturers should make their
products as safe as possible before putting them on the market.
Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis'2° presents an
interesting variation on the safety incentive theme. In Pasakarnis, the
supreme court approved the "seat belt defense' 1 2 1 as a means of miti-
gating damages in automobile accident cases. Although not a prod-
ucts liability case, this opinion illustrates how the safety incentive
policy runs throughout all of tort law. The court noted that the
"common thread running through [its] decisions has been that the law
will step in to protect people against risks which they cannot ade-
quately guard against themselves."'' 22 The law will step in to protect
people, however, only to the extent that they cannot protect them-
selves. 23 By making the seat belt defense available to defendants, the
court has placed the burden of safety on those who are in the most
reasonable position to take effective safety precautions. This is
entirely consistent with the policy of imposing liability on manufac-
turers as an incentive for placing safe products on the market.
The manufacturers of DES were the only parties who could have
taken precautions against its defectiveness. Neither the women who
116. West, 336 So. 2d at 88.
117. 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1170.
120. 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
121. The "seat belt defense" gives a defendant the chance of reducing his liability by the
extent of the injury that would not have occurred had the plaintiff worn an available seat belt.
122. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 451.
123. The court stated that the law places an emphasis on individual responsibility. Id.
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took the DES, nor their daughters were in a position to do so. If the
court allows manufacturers to escape liability because of the identifi-
cation problem, it will undercut the entire safety incentive policy.
Such a result would encourage manufacturers to market their prod-
ucts in an untraceable generic form to avoid liability in the future,
ultimately causing more DES-like situations where injured persons
would be without a remedy. By imposing liability, the court will not
only give manufacturers more incentive to produce safer products,
but will also encourage them to devise methods of assuring that their
products are traceable back to themselves. Traceability will help them
avoid liability for the defects in some other manufacturer's products.
2. RISK SPREADING
The concept that courts should impose liability on manufacturers
for injuries which their defective products cause due to the fact that
they are able to spread the cost of the risk to consumers has found
expression in Florida opinions. The Supreme Court of Florida held a
blood bank liable on a breach of implied warranty theory when a
patient contracted hepatitis from the use of its blood product. 124 Jus-
tice Roberts, in a concurring opinion, concluded that it was right to
hold the blood bank strictly liable for the defects of its product "so
that the burden of the losses resulting therefrom may be spread
among all who benefit from the operation of the blood bank, rather
than require such losses to be borne by the innocent victims alone."1 25
Another breach of implied warranty case was before the supreme
court in the form of a certified question from the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Green v. American Tobacco Co. 126 The plaintiff devel-
oped lung cancer after smoking the defendant's cigarettes for years.
The question presented was limited to the status of Florida law on
whether the manufacturer could be liable for breach of implied war-
ranty when the manufacturer" 'could not, by reasonable application
of human skill and foresight, have known of the danger' 127 associ-
ated with its product that ultimately caused injuries to consumers.
The court answered the question in the affirmative, stating that the
manufacturer's knowledge was wholly irrelevant to his liability. The
court went on to say:
124. Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967) (per curiam).
125. Id. at 121 (Roberts, J., concurring). Cf. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872,
19 So. 2d 313 (1944) (manufacturer held liable for illness caused by its canned meat).
126. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), based on response to certified question, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
127. Id. at 170 (quoting from Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir.
1962)).
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To hold that prevailing industry standards supplant the ordinary
standard of objective truth and proof, and should be conclusive on
the issue of a product's reasonable fitness for human use or con-
sumption, would be to shift to the purchaser the risk of whatever
latent defectiveness may ultimately be proven by experience and
advancement of human knowledge, a risk we are convinced was
from the inception of the implied warranty doctrine intended to be
attached to the mercantile function.
28
Implicit in this statement is the understanding that the manufacturer
should provide for the risk of defectiveness as part of the cost of doing
business. The West court expressed similar thoughts:
The obligation of the manufacturer must become what in jus-
tice it ought to be-an enterprise liability .... The cost of injuries
or damages, either to persons or property, resulting from defective
products, should be borne by the makers of the products who put
them into the channels of trade, rather than by the injured or dam-
aged persons who are ordinarily powerless to protect
themselves. '
29
Theoretically, the DES manufacturers have prepared themselves,
through insurance or other means, for the possibility of injuries aris-
ing from the use of DES when they placed it on the market.'3 0 There-
fore, if the court does not fashion some sort of recovery scheme for
Terri Lynn Conley to take advantage of this preparation, the manu-
facturers will reap a windfall because they have already passed the
cost of this preparation on to the consumers of DES. There can be no
justice in denying Terri Lynn Conley and other DES plaintiffs recov-
ery for their injuries when their mothers have already paid prices
which included the cost of this insurance.
IV. CONCLUSION
Confrontation with any traditional legal doctrine requires a thor-
ough examination of the public policy considerations which are the
128. Id. at 173.
129. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976).
130. This preparation, of course, is limited to providing for injuries caused by their own
products, not by those of other manufacturers. DES manufacturers often argue that if a court
allows a plaintiff to recover without requiring her to identify the specific manufacturer or
manufacturers of the DES ingested by her mother, then the amount the manufacturer will
have to pay will be in excess of that which its insurance was designed to cover. The problem
with this argument is that it ignores the fact that the various theories used by the courts were
designed to apportion the damages among the various manufacturers as equitably as possible.
The effect of these theories is to assign liability to the manufacturers in approximately the
proportion that they would have been liable for had there been no manufacturer identification
problem. Theoretically, these manufacturers had insured themselves for this level of liability.
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substance of the law. 131 The court must recognize the changes that
have occurred in society, and if the scope of those changes is great
enough, it must rework tort doctrine so that tort law can continue to
serve its original purpose-that of making the public policies of soci-
ety a reality in the everyday lives of individuals. This exercise is one
of the essential roles courts play in the society they serve.
The Conley v. Boyle Drug Co. 132 case will be a difficult decision
for the Supreme Court of Florida. Only if the court relaxes the
defendant identification requirement will Terri Lynn Conley have a
remedy. Relaxation of the defendant identification requirement is con-
sistent with the court's policy of compensating injured plaintiffs for
injuries caused by wrongs committed by others. It is also consistent
with the policy of preferring innocent plaintiffs over possibly culpable
131. The following passage by Professor Keeton puts the relationship between doctrine and
policy in its proper perspective:
[E]very doctrine has its foundations in policy considerations of one kind or
another, whether explicit or not. Even stare decisis, one of the most maligned of
all doctrines, has firm support in policy considerations concerned with the
preservation of the continuity essential both to fair and efficient adjudication and
to guidance of private conduct in reliance upon the law. When the issue is
whether a well-established doctrine shall be overruled, the confrontation is not
one between the doctrine of stare decisis and meritorious policy considerations.
Rather, the confrontation is concerned partly with the respective merits that the
old and the proposed doctrine would have if the lawmaker were writing on a
clean slate, partly with modifications of that appraisal that are incident to the
existence of an established doctrine, partly with the preservation of a firm
tradition of evenhanded continuity, and partly with the maintenance of a
capacity for creative development in law.
Moreover, the full association of doctrine and policy is not represented
adequately by the figure of speech that declares doctrine to be founded on policy
considerations. The policy considerations are interwoven into the fabric of the
doctrine itself. One who undertakes to interpret doctrine and to apply it
independently of attention to the policy considerations that are associated with
its creative decisional development misunderstands the doctrine itself.
. . . It is an everyday occurrence for courts to examine the more specific
formulations of a doctrine in light of the broader considerations associated with
its development, seeking the sense of the doctrine in relation to a current
problem, or even the sense of apparently competing doctrines each of which
might be extended by analogy to the current problem.... No single policy reason
is alone a satisfactory explanation of the pattern of decisions that emerges.
Relentless pursuit of the logical implications of a single policy reason is usually a
distortion of the legal doctrine expressed and implicit in a succession of related
decisions. The doctrine does not foreordain the court's conclusion. The court is
exercising a choice-a choice, however, that is to be exercised not blindly or
arbitrarily but responsibly, and under the guidance of reason and an
accumulation of ideas that are expressed or implied in legal doctrine with varying
shades of clarity.
Keeton, supra note 16, at 470-71 (footnotes omitted).
132. 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (petition for review filed Sept. 10, 1985) (No.
67,626).
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defendants. Because the Conley case is a products liability action, the
relaxation of the defendant identification requirement promotes the
court's policy of giving manufacturers the incentive to produce safe
products. It is also consistent with the court's recognition that manu-
facturers are better able than consumers to spread the risk of loss
caused by defects in their products. The court must also recognize
that the expanding use of generic drugs will inevitably cause the prob-
lem to occur again. The court must take some action that will
encourage manufacturers to assure that their products are traceable
back to themselves. To do otherwise will leave open a loophole
through which manufacturers can escape liability for injuries sus-
tained by their consumers. This result would be inconsistent with the
court's declared policy that "the law will step in to protect people
against risks which they cannot adequately guard against them-
selves."' 33 By recognizing that Terri Lynn Conley is entitled to a
remedy at law, the court will protect Florida citizens from similar
incidents in the future.
JOHN J. GRUNDHAUSER*
133. Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 451 (Fla. 1984).
* This article is lovingly dedicated to Lois for her love and support, and to my little
goddaughter, Rosemary Joan.
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